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INTRODUCTION

In today’s global economy, more businesses are focusing on
1
giving back to the world community ; minimizing carbon
2
3
footprints ; maximizing renewable energy ; engaging in beneficial
1. The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation is one such organization. See THE
BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUND., http://www.gatesfoundation.org/Pages/home
.aspx (last visited Oct. 6, 2011).
The Grand Challenges in Global Health initiative is focused on engaging
creative minds to work on scientific and technological breakthroughs for
the world’s most pressing health problems.
Grand Challenges
Explorations is a grant program within the initiative that fosters
innovative, early-stage research to expand the pipeline of ideas that can
lead to those much needed global health and development solutions.
Grand Challenges in Global Health, THE BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUND.,
http://www.gatesfoundation.org/global-health/Pages/grand-challengesexplorations.aspx (last visited Oct. 6, 2011). One of the new Grand Challenges in
Global Health initiatives that won additional funding is in Tanzania. IFAKARA
Health Institute, THE BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUND., http://www.gatesfoundation
.org/Grants-2009/Pages/IFAKARA-Health-Institute-OPP53214.aspx (last visited
Oct. 6, 2011). This project is testing “placement of outdoor decoy sites that attract
and trap breeding, resting and feeding mosquitoes for their ability to reduce
malaria transmission in rural communities.” Ling Wong, Can Bacteria Protect
Against HIV? Grand Challenges Explorations Grants Help Ask the Question, IMPATIENT
OPTIMISTS (July 13, 2011), http://www.impatientoptimists.org/Posts/2011/07
/Can-Bacteria-Protect-Against-HIV-Grand-Challenges-Explorations-Grants-HelpAsk-the-Question. This statement by Bill Gates best reflects the vision of the Gates
Foundation: “I believe that risk-taking is essential if we are to achieve truly
transformative health technologies.” Bill Gates, Discovery Science—Taking the
Challenge, THE GATESNOTES (Oct. 26, 2010), http://www.thegatesnotes.com
/Topics/Health/Discovery-Science-Taking-the-Challenge.
ACTION
PROGRAMME,
2. See
Green
Directory,
CLIMATE
http://www.climateactionprogramme.org/green_directory/ (last visited Oct. 6,
2011), for descriptions of programs being instituted around the world to reduce
carbon footprints through renewable energy sources.
3. In the United Kingdom, Scotland presently leads with offshore wind,
onshore wind, wave, and tidal energy as part of their package of renewable energy
sources. Marine, SCOTTISH RENEWABLES, http://www.scottishrenewables.com
/technologies/marine/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2011); Offshore Wind, SCOTTISH
RENEWABLES,
http://www.scottishrenewables.com/technologies/offshore-wind/
(last visited Oct. 5, 2011); Onshore Wind, SCOTTISH RENEWABLES,
http://www.scottishrenewables.com/technologies/onshore-wInd/ (last visited
Oct. 6, 2011). Because the territorial waters off England, Wales, Scotland, and
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4

social purposes, such as aiding homeless veterans, those who are
mentally disabled or ill, are former convicts, or are elderly and in
Ireland belong to the British Crown, all offshore wind, wave, and tidal renewable
technologies must be developed in tandem with the “Crown Estate,” which is a
statutory corporation in England. Offshore Wind Energy, THE CROWN ESTATE,
http://www.thecrownestate.co.uk/offshore_wind_energy (last visited Oct. 6,
2011); Wave and Tidal, THE CROWN ESTATE, http://www.thecrownestate.co.uk
/energy/wave-and-tidal (last visited Oct. 6, 2011). Scotland likely will be seeking a
vote for independence within the next two years because of the Crown Estate in
order to be able to retain the revenues generated by Scottish renewable
technologies. Simon Johnson, David Cameron and Alex Salmond at Loggerheads Over
Scottish Independence Vote, THE TELEGRAPH (May 9, 2011, 7:00 AM BST),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/scotland/scottish-politics/8501020
/David-Cameron-and-Alex-Salmond-at-loggerheads-over-Scottish-independencevote.html. A possible alternative to a vote for independence might be the
devolvement of the Crown Estate to each of the revenue-generating countries.
Salmond Calls to Devolution of the Crown Estate, FISHNEWSEU.COM (June 22, 2011, 10:42
AM),
http://www.fishnewseu.com/latest-news/scottish/6045-salmondalls-fordevolution-of-the-crown-estate.html. Northern Ireland is also being developed as a
productive source of wind and wave energy. Jessica Shankleman, Crown Estate to
Kick Off Northern Irish Offshore Renewables Leasing Round, BUS. GREEN (Mar. 8, 2011),
http://www.businessgreen.com/bg/news/2032033/crown-estate-kick-northernirish-offshore-renewables-leasing-round.
4. Social Enterprise Alliance (SEA), www.se-alliance.org, is a membership
organization comprised of approximately 700 members in the United States and
Canada that brings together nonprofits, venture capitalists, corporations, and
service providers for the purpose of “actively building the field of social enterprise
through networking opportunities, educational forums, strategic partnerships, and
impact legislation.”
About Us, SOC. ENTER. ALLIANCE, https://www.sealliance.org/about (last visited Oct. 6, 2011). SEA has defined a “social
enterprise” as “an organization or venture that achieves its primary social or
environmental mission using business methods.” What is Social Enterprise?, SOC.
ENTER. ALLIANCE, https://www.se-alliance.org/what-is-social-enterprise (last visited
Oct. 6, 2011).
A “social enterprise” differs from a “socially responsible” organization in two ways:
Social enterprises directly address social needs through their products
and services or through the numbers of disadvantaged people they
employ. This distinguishes them from “socially responsible businesses,”
which create positive social change indirectly through the practice of
corporate social responsibility (e.g., creating and implementing a
philanthropic foundation; paying equitable wages to their employees;
using environmentally friendly raw materials; providing volunteers to
help with community projects).
Social enterprises use earned revenue strategies to pursue a double or
triple bottom line, either alone (as a social sector business, in either the
private or the nonprofit sector) or as a significant part of a nonprofit’s
mixed revenue stream that also includes charitable contributions and
public sector subsidies.
This distinguishes them from traditional
nonprofits, which rely primarily on philanthropic and government
support.
Id.
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need of palliative care; granting financial aid to patients for cancer
5
6
treatments ; providing low-income, low-energy housing; giving aid
7
to victims of tsunamis and nuclear disasters; and donating to areas
8
hit by freak storms and other weather conditions, or to
9
communities decimated by civil war and newly overthrown rulers.
In each of these cases, businesses and individuals are themselves
donating or investing in organizations that are reaching out to
“give back” to a targeted group of people or to a cause or to
otherwise engage in a socially-driven or beneficial purpose.
In the United States and the United Kingdom, local and
national governments have initiated measures to reduce
dependence on fossil fuels and to switch to renewable energy
10
11
sources. In the United States, solar energy is well developed.
5. See Resources for Financial Assistance for Patients and Their Families, NAT’L
CANCER INST., https://cissecure.nci.nih.gov/factsheet/FactSheetSearch8_3.aspx
(last visited Oct. 6, 2011), for a site with a U.S. database of government and
nonprofit organizations that provide aid for cancer patients who either have no
health insurance or who need financial help notwithstanding the presence of
health insurance.
6. The Office of Community Service offers low-energy, low-income housing
as well as many other specialized programs directed toward the healthy
maintenance of the family. See Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program
(LIHEAP), ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ocs/liheap/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2011).
7. University students at Brandeis worked with the Red Cross to raise funds
to send aid to victims of Japan’s tsunami and resulting nuclear disaster. Susan
Chaityn Lebovits, Japan Relief Fundraising Aiding Victims of Disaster, BRANDEISNOW
(Apr. 4, 2011), http://www.brandeis.edu/now/2011/april/japan.html.
8. In response to the Joplin, Missouri disaster, an individual businessman
began selling t-shirts with a picture of Uncle Sam stating: “America Lends a Hand.”
Proceeds from the sales were sent to the Joplin area, as well as North Dakota.
Westporter’s T-Shirt Sales to Aid Midwest Disaster Victims, WESTPORT NEWS (July 21,
2011, 4:21 PM), http://www.westport-news.com/news/article/Westporter-s-Tshirt-sales-to-aid-Midwest-1527924.php.
9. For example, in Yemen, the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance
continued to provide food and medical aid to the people of Yemen during its civil
war. Yemen-Complex Emergency, U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV. (Mar. 17, 2011),
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/co
untries/yemen/template/fs_sr/fy2011/yemen_ce_fs02_03-17-2011.pdf.
10. In the United States, twenty-nine states have initiated measures to reduce
reliance on fossil fuels in favor of renewable energy sources. See State-Federal RPS
Collaborative, CLEAN ENERGY STATES ALLIANCE, http://www.cleanenergystates.org
/projects/state-federal-rps-collaborative/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2011). Depending
upon the geographic region, each state’s reason for implementing “green”
initiatives may differ. For example, coastal states are concerned with global
warming and rising tides. Western states are more concerned with long droughts.
Midwestern states fear impact on agriculture, whereas other states consider
“green” directives to be job enhancers.
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Wind energy is a growing renewable resource in the United States
with onshore and offshore sites in place in the West and other
12
offshore sites being built along the East Coast. Wave energy is less
In the United Kingdom, England has already, through the Crown Estate,
implemented offshore wind turbines. See Offshore Wind Energy, THE CROWN ESTATE,
http://www.thecrownestate.co.uk/offshore_wind_energy (last visited Oct. 6,
2011). The Crown Estate also operates wind, wave, and tidal turbines in Scottish
and Northern Irish territorial waters through bidding developers. See id. All
revenues from offshore facilities in Scottish and Northern Irish territorial waters
pass to the Crown Estate in the United Kingdom. Scottish Government Criticizes
Crown Estate’s Plans for Coastal Communities Fund, OFFSHOREWIND.BIZ (July 25,
2011), http://www.offshorewind.biz/2011/07/25/scottish-government-criticizescrown-estates-plans-for-coastal-communities-fund/.
11. For example, the DuPont Company is now actively involved in the solar
energy field with the purchase of Innovalight. DuPont Snaps up Innovalight in Solar
Push, BUS. GREEN (July 26, 2011), http://www.businessgreen.com/bg/news
/2096739/dupont-snaps-innovalight-solar-push. United States solar energy is
generally positioned in California, Arizona, Colorado, and Florida, as well as other
states. LARRY SHERWOOD, U.S. SOLAR MARKET TRENDS 8–11 (2011), available at
http://irecusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/IREC-Solar-Market-TrendsReport-June-2011-web.pdf. In general, solar energy can be set up anywhere;
however, the issue is one of “tying in” to an existing grid, which is a costly
endeavor in many circumstances. See Grid Integration for Systems Integration, U.S.
DEP’T OF ENERGY (July 30, 2010), http://www1.eere.energy.gov/solar/grid
_integration.html.
WIND
ENERGY
ASS’N,
12. See
Industry
Statistics,
AM.
http://www.awea.org/learnabout/industry_stats/index.cfm (last visited Oct. 6,
2011). Today, the United States generates 42,432 megawatts (MW) of cumulative
installed capacity of wind power, making it the second largest generator of wind
energy—second only to China. See id. Texas leads the country in the generation
of wind energy, largely through the Roscoe Wind Farm as well as many other wind
farms located throughout the state. See, e.g., Eileen O’Grady, E.ON Completes
World’s Largest Wind Farm in Texas, REUTERS (Oct. 1, 2009, 6:00 AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/10/01/wind-texasidUSN3023624320091001 (naming Texas as the leading state for wind capacity
and discussing the completion of Roscoe Wind Farm). The U.S. Department of
Energy issued its 20% Wind Energy By 2030, predicting that twenty percent of U.S.
electricity will be produced by wind, with four percent of that being generated by
offshore wind. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, 20% WIND ENERGY BY 2030, at 10 (2008),
available at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy08osti/41869.pdf.
In Delaware, Bluewater Wind LLC contracted to set up the first wind
turbines off Fenwick Island where winds are steady and the coastal shelf is
relatively shallow, making maintenance easier and less costly. Mark Svenvold,
Wind-Power Politics, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008
/09/14/magazine/14wind-t.html?pagewanted=all. However, in 2008 when the
economy turned, the loans that guaranteed the wind project were withdrawn. Id.
Presently, Senators Tom Carper of Delaware and Olympia Snowe of Maine have
offered legislation that would offer tax incentives for investors in projects like
Bluewater Wind. Press Release, Sen. Tom Carper, Sens. Carper, Snowe Introduce
Bill to Encourage Offshore Wind Energy Production (July 21, 2011), available at
http://carper.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/pressreleases?ID=fdef0fd4-8302-488e-
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developed in the United States but does exist, particularly along
13
the Oregon coast. Underwater turbines are currently being tested
14
in the Mississippi and East Rivers in the United States.
Scotland and Northern Ireland are far ahead of the United
15
States in the renewable energies of wind and wave technologies.
However, one difficulty that Scotland and Ireland face in
benefitting directly from their renewable energy efforts is that the
Crown Estate claims all revenues from offshore wind and wave
16
facilities in Scotland and Northern Ireland.
Yet, what each of these renewable energy undertakings has in
common is a “beneficial” purpose. In the past, for-benefit entities
in the United States were generally organized as nonprofit
17
The same choice is available in the United
corporations.
Kingdom, but the entity’s purpose is traditionally limited to
18
However, a true nonprofit entity does not allow an
charities.
aae6-4caf97975ba1.
13. Tracy Loew, Oregon is First U.S. Site for a Wave-Power Farm, USA TODAY (Feb.
17, 2010), http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/energy/environment
/2010-02-16-wave-energy_N.htm. Wave energy in the United States has generally
been met with skepticism due to the erratic nature of waves and concern for the
aquatic environment. See id. One wave site was established off the coast of Oregon
over two years ago but it sank. Id. Now another is in place but the costs are five to
six times that of wind energy. Id.
14. Peter Fairley, Tidal Turbines Help Light Up Manhattan, TECH. REV. (Apr. 23,
2007), http://www.technologyreview.com/energy/18567/?mod=related; Phil
McKenna, Turbines Could Tap the Mississippi’s Power, TECH. REV. (Nov. 5, 2010),
http://www.technologyreview.com/energy/26679/.
15. See sources cited supra note 3.
16. See Offshore Wind Energy, THE CROWN ESTATE, http://www.thecrownestate
.co.uk/offshore_wind_energy (last visited Oct. 6, 2011). One proposal by the
United Kingdom is that fifty percent of Scottish revenues from offshore
technologies would be returned to the Crown Estate. Scottish Government Criticizes
Crown Estate’s Plans for Coastal Communities Fund, OFFSHOREWIND.BIZ (July 25,
2011), http://www.offshorewind.biz/2011/07/25/scottish-government-criticizescrown-estates-plans-for-coastal-communities-fund/. Scottish Ministers, however,
seek full devolution of Scottish territorial waters. Id. For a dialogue between
Professor Conaway and Scottish practitioners, see LINKEDIN correspondence from
Professor Conaway to Scottish Renewable Energy (on file with author), available at
http://www.linkedin.com/groupAnswers?viewQuestionAndAnswers=&discussionI
D=61630111&gid=1795794&trk=eml-anet_dig-b_pd-pmr-cn.
17. A nonprofit corporation is organized as a corporation, but its “members”
do not receive distributions as stockholders as in for-profit corporations. Cf. I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(3) (2006) (explaining that no part of a nonprofit’s net earnings benefit
private shareholders). For U.S. tax regulations and exemptions governing
organizations see id. §§ 501–515.
18. Under English Companies Law, a not-for-profit entity could be organized
as a company limited by guarantee if it states a beneficial purpose under the
Statute of Elizabeth and prohibits any distributions to shareholders/members.
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investor to receive any return on his or her investment. For
example, all “profits” are redistributed to the entity and not to its
19
members or investors.
In the present economy, entrepreneurs increasingly wish to
invest capital in socially responsible businesses and to receive an
internal return—a true admixture of profit and “social benefit.” In
addition, these “social entrepreneurs” increasingly seek capital
from private investors or foundations with “program related
investments,” or “PRIs,” that include low-interest loans or loan
guarantees to nonprofit charities or organizations engaged in
20
Examples of hybrid organizations
socially beneficial efforts.
blending profit with “benefit” in the United States include the B, or
21
22
Benefit, Corporation and the L3C. Each of these hybrid entities
Companies Act, 1985, c. 6, § 1 (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk
/ukpga/1985/6/contents. A corporation is formed when two or more persons
subscribe their names to a memorandum of association that is then registered at
Companies House. See Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 7 (U.K.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/contents. Under the Twelfth EC
Companies Law Directive, a single person may subscribe to the memorandum of
association if the company is to be a single member private limited company. As
of 2008, a charitable organization in England may also be organized as an
unincorporated association, a trust, or a corporation by Royal Charter. Charities
Act, 2006, c. 50, §§ 31–34 (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga
/2006/50/contents. A “charitable purpose” is defined fifteen ways under the
Charities Act of 2006. Id. § 2.
19. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
20. Julia Vail, Program-related Investments Provide Needed Relief, PHILANTHROPY J.
(Mar.
16,
2009),
http://www.philanthropyjournal.org/resources/specialreports/finance-accounting/program-related-investments-provide-needed-relief.
PRIs were primarily jump-started by the Tax Reform Act of 1969 and the Ford
Foundation. Id. The Foundation Center reports that in 2009 $50,000 was granted
to the Sierra Club in California to study methods of saving energy by studying
building codes. Global Philanthropy, FOUND. CTR., http://foundationcenter.org
/gpf/climatechange/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2011). The PRI grant for the Sierra Club
came from the George Gund Foundation. Id. The only other “renewable energy”
grants reported by the Foundation Center were for $600,000 in 2007 by the W.K.
Kellogg Foundation to ZERO Regional Environment Organisation for solar and
wind powered water systems in Zimbabwe and $100,000 in 2010 from the Ford
Foundation to FIS Social Company, SA to develop an innovative business model
for distributing sustainable solar panels to poor rural families in Peru and
Argentina. Id. Other general grants were made to study climate changes, but no
others were made on the specific issue of renewable energy sources or technology
in the United States. Id.
21. See Ann E. Conaway, Lessons to be Learned: How the Policy of Freedom of
Contract in Delaware’s Alternative Entity Law Might Inform Delaware’s General
Corporation Law, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 789 (2008) [hereinafter Lessons to be Learned]
(discussing in depth the advent of the B Corporation in the context of “freedom
to contract” in favor of “other constituencies” in a corporation’s life).
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23

carries significant pre-packaged disadvantages.
In the United Kingdom, the limited company may provide forbenefit and for-profit services since the company exists for whatever
“purposes” are set forth in the articles of association. The fiduciary
duties of the directors are thereafter linked to the “purposes” of the
company even if those purposes seem to be in conflict with one
another. The limited company is currently regulated by the
Companies Act of 1985 (1989), the Insolvency Act of 1986, the
Company Directors Disqualification Act of 1986, the Business
Names Act of 1985, the Financial Services Act of 1986, and the
24
In the United
Income and Corporations Taxes Act of 1988.
Kingdom, however, the organization that is being used by an
22. The L3C is a low-profit limited liability company that has a primary social
purpose and a secondary profit purpose. Id. at 792 n.10. The first state to enact
the L3C was Vermont. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27) (2010). Other states with
L3C legislation include Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, North Carolina,
Utah, Wyoming, The Crow Indian Nation of Montana, and The Oglala Sioux
Tribe. See ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/1–26 (West Supp. 2010); H.R. 1421, 2010
Leg., Reg. Sess., 2010 La. Acts 417; ME. REV. STAT. tit. 31, §§ 1599, 1611 (2010);
MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 450.4102(m) (LexisNexis Supp. 2010); Act of Aug. 3,
2010, S. 308, 2009 Sess. (N.C. 2009), http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/Sessions/2009
/Bills/Senate/PDF/S308v5.pdf; UTAH CODE ANN. § 48–2c–412 (LexisNexis Supp.
2010), repealed by Unincorporated Business Entity Uniform Acts of 2011, S.B. 131,
2011 Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17–15–102(a)(ix) (2009)
(repealed 2010); L3C Information, RURAL DYNAMICS INC.COM (Jan. 14, 2009, 11:54
AM), http://www.ruraldynamics.org/l3c-information (discussing Crow Indian
Nation’s passing of L3C legislation); Low-profit Limited Liability Companies (L3Cs),
LAWFORCHANGE, http://www.lawforchange.org/lfc/NewsBot.asp?MODE=VIEW
&ID=3869&SnID=2 (last visited Sept. 26, 2011) (discussing the Ogala Sioux Tribe’s
adoption of L3C legislation). By enacting legislation at the state level, jurisdictions
with the L3C create a hybrid organization that allows entrepreneurs to invest in a
hybrid entity that can receive “program related investment” income from
investment firms without adhering to rigid nonprofit tax regulation. See Lessons to
be Learned, supra note 21, at 792 n.10, 801 n.36.
23. See J. William Callison & Allan W. Vestal, The L3C Illusion: Why Low-Profit
Limited Liability Companies Will Not Stimulate Socially Optimal Private Foundation
Investment in Entrepreneurial Ventures, 35 VT. L. REV. 273, 274 (2010) (“[W]ithout
changes to federal PRI [‘program-related investment’ provisions for private
foundations] rules, the L3C construct has little or no value. Indeed, the existence
of the state law form, without matching federal income tax substance, is dangerous
since the ill-advised may assume value and use the form.”).
24. See Companies Act, 1989, c. 40, §§ 72–76, 78–79 (U.K.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1989/40/contents (detailing the regulation
in which limited companies are subject to the Financial Services Act in sections
72–76, Insolvency Act section 78, and Company Directors Qualification Act section
79); Incomes and Corporations Tax Act, 1988, c. 1, § 6. (U.K.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/1/contents/enacted; Business Names
Act, 1985, c. 7, § 1 (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1985
/7/contents.
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increasing number of developers in the renewable energy sector is
the limited liability partnership, or “LLP.” Yet, the United
Kingdom LLP functions in many ways like the limited company,
including mandatory compliance with inflexible filing rules,
internal managerial regulations, public listing of members’ or
owners’ names, required presence of auditors and auditing
procedures, compliance with insolvency regulations, and
25
application of the Company Directors Disqualifications Act 1986.
In the United States, the preeminent solution is the flexible,
contractually based Delaware limited liability company, or “LLC.”
The thesis of this article is that, presently, the Delaware LLC
provides global investors maximum internal efficiency, as well as
asset protection at a decreased agency cost, for businesses
operating solely within or outside the United States for sociallydriven enterprises. The Delaware LLC offers contractual freedom
to investors, managers, owners, funds, and foundations to structure
a for-benefit, for-profit socially responsible business plan with
limited liability for owners and investors, including maximum tax
efficiencies within the United States or the United Kingdom due to
its completely mobile, contractual character.
II. INTRODUCTION TO GLOBAL CHOICE OF ENTITY FOR SOCIALLYDRIVEN BUSINESSES
Today, a host of entities masquerade as for-benefit
organizations. The best known of these entities is the nonprofit
corporation. Yet, because the nonprofit corporation is driven by a
mandatory corporate infrastructure—non-distribution of profits to
equity holders and compliance with Internal Revenue Code
regulations—the nonprofit corporation is inflexible in today’s
demanding marketplace for investors who want a return on their
investment.
Another new “benefit” corporation being touted by B Lab is
26
the “Benefit Corporation,” otherwise known as the B Corporation.
25. Limited Liability Partnerships Act, 2000, c. 12 (U.K.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/12/contents;
Limited
Liability
Partnerships Regulations, 2001, S.I. 2001/1090, art. 3 (U.K.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2001/1090/contents/made (adopting the full
text of the Companies Act 1985 and the Company Directors Disqualification Act
1986, virtually unmodified).
26. About Certified B Corps, B LABS, http://www.bcorporation.net/about (last
visited Oct. 6, 2011).
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Unlike the nonprofit corporation, the B Corporation is a forbenefit/for-profit corporation that permits its owners to invest in a
socially-driven-purpose organization and to benefit financially at
27
A B Corporation must, however, amend its
the same time.
28
certificate of incorporation to become a valid B Corporation. The
B Corporation must also be “certified” by meeting specific B Lab
29
standards in order to carry the moniker of B Corporation.
Inherent contractual and fiduciary conflicts arise under the
governance paradigm of the B Corporation without statutory
clarification since the B Corporation permits profit maximization
to shareholders in para passu with the maximization of
30
environmental, consumer, and community benefits. Proponents
of the B Corporation rely on “constituency” statutes as a
31
fundamental basis for the conflicted dual-purpose B entity.
27. See Celia R. Taylor, Berle and Social Businesses: A Consideration, 34 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 1501, 1513 (2011) (“B Corporations agree to engage in ‘triple bottom
line’ accounting, focusing on social, environmental, and economic returns.”).
28. See id. (“To gain the ‘B Corporation’ designation (granted by B Lab), a
corporation must . . . amend its articles of incorporation to state explicitly that
managers must consider the interests of employees, the community, and the
environment.”).
29. See Lessons to be Learned, supra note 21, at 793 n.12.
30. See Taylor, supra note 27, at 1516 (“B Corporation directors may decide
not to take a particular action that would be profit-maximizing because they
conclude that it would harm the environment (thereby doing no harm), but they
still must be concerned that their actions ultimately redound to the benefit of
their shareholders.”).
31. Several jurisdictions have constituency statutes. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 10-1202(A) (2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-756(d) (2010); FLA. STAT. §
607.0830(3) (2011); HAW. REV. STAT. § 414-221(b) (2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 301-602 (2010); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8.85 (2011); IND. CODE § 23-1-35-1(d) (2010);
IOWA CODE § 490.1108A (2011); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.12-210(4) (West 2010);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:92(G) (2010); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 13-C, § 831(6) (2011);
MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 156B, § 65 (2010); MINN. STAT. § 302A.251 (2010); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 79-4-8.30(d) (2010); MO. REV. STAT. § 351.347 (2010); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 21-2045(1) (2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-1(2) (West 2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
53-11-35D (2011); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717(b) (Consol. 2010); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 1701.59(E) (West 2010); OR. REV. STAT. § 60.357(5) (2010); 15 PA. CONS.
STAT. §§ 1715(a), 1716(a) (2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-5.2-8(a) (2010); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 47-33-4(1) (2011); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-18-301 (2011); WIS.
STAT. § 180.0827 (2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-16-830(g) (2011).
Generally, the constituency statutes exist as amendments to statutory
statements as to directorial duties of care. See Lessons to be Learned, supra note 21, at
794 n.16. In a typical case, constituency acts provide that in satisfying managerial
duties of care, directors may consider the interests of “stakeholders” such as
employees, suppliers, customers, creditors, and the community at large. Id.
Because these acts were born out of the hostile takeover era of the 1980s and
1990s, many of the acts were originally triggered upon a change in control.
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Additionally, a highly criticized for-benefit/for-profit entity is
the L3C. The L3C is technically a hybrid entity that is organized as
32
a low-profit entity but with a social purpose. The L3C, from a tax
perspective, will generally permit income and expenses to “flow
33
However, tax-exempt members must
through” to members.
34
consider the impact of any unrelated business income. The L3C
is organized as any other LLC and thus may be: (1) membermanaged; (2) manager-managed; or (3) managed by a board of
35
managers. The rights and duties of the members and managers
will be set forth in the L3C Certificate of Formation and Operating
36
Agreement. The capital structure of the L3C is typically designed
to permit tax-exempt, program-related investments by private
37
Distributions to
foundations as well as for-profit sources.
members are made in accordance with the terms of the Operating
38
Agreement of the L3C. The confusion arising from the L3C is
that the exact same capital, managerial, and profit/benefit

Today, however, most of the constituency acts do not operate solely within the
context of hostile acquisitions (only Connecticut, Iowa, Louisiana, Missouri,
Oregon, Rhode Island, and Tennessee limit their constituency acts to corporate
acquisitions), and only Connecticut requires consideration of constituent
interests—all other “stakeholder” acts are permissive only. Id.
Given the history underlying these acts, and the permissive nature of their
reach, it is difficult to imagine how a B Corporation could legally “expand” the
scope of directorial duties owed to stockholders and the common law on this issue
based upon these acts. Id. The legal argument seems tenuous at best.
32. See Lessons to be Learned, supra note 21, at 792 n.10.
33. See infra Part III.D.
34. The IRS has not ruled that an investment in an L3C will necessarily
qualify as a program-related investment (PRI). The IRS has issued private letter
rulings permitting PRIs that were set up as LLC investments. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 2006-03-031 (Oct. 25, 2005) (finding that a private foundation that invested
in a private for-profit pharmaceutical company organized to help solve global
health issues was a tax-exempt investment under Internal Revenue Code section
4942(g) (2007)); see also I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2006-10-020 (Dec. 13, 2005) (finding
that a private foundation’s contributions to an LLC formed to invest in lowincome communities qualified as a PRI under Internal Revenue Code section
4944(c) (2006)). In each of these cases, LLCs were the entities of choice, not
L3Cs.
35. See infra Part III.D.
36. Callison & Vestal, supra note 23, at 287–88 (explaining that an L3C
Operating Agreement can establish fiduciary duties).
37. See id. at 273 (“The result was intended to . . . allow[] private foundation
money to flow more efficiently and in greater quantity into profit-making
ventures.”).
38. Id. at 287 (“[T]he operating agreement can . . . establish fiduciary rules
governing members and managers.”).
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purposes can be achieved by an LLC without an L3C designation.
Yet, the proponents of L3C legislation argue that the primary focus
of “benefit,” rather than profit, warrants the necessity of new
40
legislation. This justification by L3C proponents is nonsensical
considering the flexibility of today’s Delaware LLC, along with its
Court of Chancery and the Delaware Supreme Court’s
unprecedented learning curve in regards to their knowledge and
appreciation of the standard and sophisticated contractual LLC.
The English LLP, though currently available in England and
Scotland, is not a legislative choice for Irish investors. In addition,
41
the English LLP requires for its existence at least two owners. The
Scottish LLP also mandates two owners and thus immediately
extinguishes any use of the Scottish LLP as a special purpose
42
The English LLP also shares many required inflexible
entity.
corporate characteristics, including publication of members’ names
despite lack of personal liability, mandatory auditor presence and
auditor filings, and compliance with the Insolvency Act of 1986 and
the Company Directors Disqualification Act of 1986, even where
43
directors are not present in the entity.
Finally, the United Kingdom limited company is available for a
renewable energy technology company that combines beneficial
and economic purposes. To achieve this cooperative financial
effort, the memorandum of association (or the articles of
association under the reforms of the Companies Act 2006) of the
limited company will set forth in great detail the purposes and
39. See Dana Brakman Reiser, Blended Enterprise and the Dual Mission Dilemma,
35 VT. L. REV. 105, 109 (2010) (“The L3C adopts the LLC governance framework
with virtually no changes.”).
40. See Callison & Vestal, supra note 23, at 273 (discussing the process
through which proponents of L3C legislation advocated for the legislation).
41. Limited Liability Partnerships Act, 2000, c. 12, § 2(1)(a) (U.K.), available
at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/12/contents.
42. See id. § 2(2)(c); see also Limited Liability Partnerships (Scotland)
Regulations, 2001, S.I. 2001/128, § 3(b), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk
/ssi/2001/128/pdfs/ssi_20010128_en.pdf (incorporating the Limited Liability
Partnerships Act, 2000, into the Scottish LLP regulations).
43. See Limited Liability Partnerships Act, 2000, c. 12, § 2(2)(e)–(f) (U.K.),
available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/12/contents (stating that
all members, both designated and non-designated, must include their names on
the incorporation document); Limited Liability Partnerships Regulations, 2001,
S.I. 1090, § 3 (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2001/1090
/contents/made (incorporating the Accounts and Audit provision of Part VII of
the Companies Act, 1985, into the English LLP regulations); id. at § 4(2)
(incorporating the Company Director Disqualification Act 1986 and the
Insolvency Act 1986 into the English LLP regulations).
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objectives of the limited company, including the procedures that
44
management is to follow in carrying out company objectives.
Thereafter, the fiduciary duties owed by managers will track the
detailed statement of purposes and objectives published in the
memorandum of association or articles of association as registered
45
in the Companies House. It is left to the managers of the limited
company to sort and implement the fiduciary duties to the
company according to their best efforts and without engaging in
46
competition with the company.
The most flexible contractual entity presently available in the
global marketplace is the Delaware limited liability company. The
Delaware LLC begins with the significant advantage of operating
under a state policy of “freedom of contract” and “[maximum]
47
enforceability of limited liability company agreements.” Freedom
of contract grants investors in a Delaware LLC the ability to
structure operating agreements according to the sophistication of
the parties and the nature of the business. In this sense, a Delaware
LLC would permit the creation of a for-benefit, for-profit entity
without any special designation and could also eliminate duties or
liabilities for breach of duties between contradictory financial
interests.
III. CHOICE OF ENTITY IN THE UNITED STATES AND UNITED
KINGDOM FOR SOCIALLY-DRIVEN BUSINESSES
A. The United Kingdom Limited Liability Partnership
1.

General Background

The LLP in England, Wales, and Scotland received Royal
Assent for “incorporation” by any two or more persons who wish to

44. See infra Part III.B.
45. See Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 171 (U.K.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/contents (“A director of a
company must—(a) act only in accordance with the company’s constitution, and
(b) only exercise powers for the purposes for which they were conferred.”). See
generally Gordon L. Clark & Eric R. W. Knight, Implications of the UK Companies Act
2006 for Institutional Investors and the Market for Corporate Social Responsibility, 11 U.
PA. J. BUS. L. 259 (2009).
46. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 172 (U.K.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/contents.
47. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b) (2010).
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48

go into business together on July 20, 2000. The effective date for
49
the United Kingdom LLP Act was April 6, 2001.
The United Kingdom LLP combines the organizational
flexibility and pass-through default tax status of a partnership, but
unlike its American counterpart, imposes “corporate” filing
requirements, mandatory auditing procedures, statutory insolvency
mandates, and adherence to the Company Directors
Disqualifications Act. The “owners” in a United Kingdom LLP are
50
In England and Wales,
“members” rather than “partners.”
partners in a partnership have joint liability for partnership
obligations and debts, as do partners in a United States partnership
51
governed by the Uniform Partnership Act of 1914. Those same
partners have joint and several liability for losses or damages
resulting from conduct occurring in the ordinary course of the
partnership business or with the consent of the partners inasmuch
52
as the partnership is not an entity. Scotland, however, adopted
independent partnership legislation in 2001—following the
Revised Uniform Partnership Act of 1994—that imposes joint and
several liability on all partners for contract and tort liabilities of the
53
partnership.
Because of the growth of professional partnerships in the
United Kingdom and the potential for a “doomsday” claim—a
48. Limited Liability Partnerships Act, 2000, c. 12, Introduction (U.K.),
available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/12/contents.
49. The Act came into legal effect on April 6, 2001 by virtue of the Limited
Liability Partnerships Act 2000 (Commencement) Order 2000. Limited Liability
Partnerships Act, 2000, c. 12 (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk
/ukpga/2000/12/contents.
50. In the use of the term “members” for the “owners” of the U.K. LLP,
England, Scotland, and Wales have created an entity that more resembles the
original U.S. two-member LLC for professionals—with the exception of the U.K.
“transparency” requirements for public posting of members’ names, mandatory
auditing procedures, and other corporate regulations.
51. See Partnership Act, 1890, 53 & 54 Vict., c. 39, § 9 (1890) (U.K.), available
at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Vict/53-54/39/contents; UNIF. P’SHIP
ACT (1914) § 15, 1 U.L.A. 117 (2001).
52. See Partnership Act, 1890, 53 & 54 Vict., c. 39, § 9 (1890) (U.K.), available
at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Vict/53-54/39/contents; UNIF. P’SHIP
ACT (1914) § 15, 1 U.L.A. 117 (2001). A partnership is formed by the mere
association of two or more persons to participate in the control of a business for
profit. See, e.g., REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT (1997) § 202, 1 U.L.A. 92 (2001) (“[T]he
association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit
forms a partnership, whether or not the persons intend to form a partnership.”).
53. See The Limited Liability Partnerships (Scotland) Regulations, 2001, S.I.
2001/128, available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ssi/2001/128/pdfs/ssi
_20010128_en.pdf.
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claim against the personal assets of a partner for actions of an
unknown partner who may be located in another part of the
country or even outside the country and where the claim exceeds
the assets of the partnership or the firm’s insurance coverage—
England, Wales, and Scotland adopted the LLP primarily for
professionals since these persons cannot escape their general duty
54
With these
of care to their clients for ordinary negligence.
parameters in mind, the United Kingdom LLP allows members to
enjoy protection from personal liability for contractual obligations
of the partnership as well as torts committed by a wrongdoing
55
partner acting in the ordinary course of the partnership. In this
sense, the United Kingdom LLP is a legal entity separate from its
56
members and is deemed to be a “body corporate.”
2.

Formation

To “incorporate” an LLP in the United Kingdom, a name must
be checked against the index of names maintained by the Registrar
57
A
of Companies according to the Companies Act of 1985.
founder has no procedure to “register” a name in advance of
formation of the LLP, but does have the obligation to examine the
records at Companies House, to ensure that the LLP does not have
a name that is “the same as” or “too like” an existing name shown

54. “The only option for many professions, in the past, was to operate as
partnerships. . . . The fact that professional bodies were required to operate as
partnerships meant that they were subject to the particular rules relating to the
liability of partners.” Limited Liability Partnerships Act, 2000, c. 12, n.7 (U.K),
available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/12/notes/division/3.
55. Id. § 1(5) (“[E]xcept as far as otherwise provided by this Act or any other
enactment, the law relating to partnerships does not apply to a limited liability
partnership.”).
56. “A limited liability partnership is a body corporate (with legal personality
separate from that of its members) which is formed by being incorporated under this Act . . . .”
Id. § 1(2) (emphasis added).
57. If an LLP carries on business under a name that is not its registered
name, it must comply with the provisions of the Business Names Act 1985. Section
4(1)(b) of the Business Names Act states that the corporate name of an LLP and
the name of each member must be shown on all premises where the business is
conducted under the business name so that clients, customers, and suppliers may
have access to this information. Business Names Act, 1985, c. 7, § 4(1)(b) (U.K.),
available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1985/7/contents.
This
information must also be given in writing to any person who requests it. Id. § 4(4).
If the LLP fails to comply with these provisions of the Business Names Act, the
members may be subject to criminal penalties and the LLP may be unable to
enforce contracts made under the business name. Id. §§ 5(1), 7(4)–(5).
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58

on the records.
Once a name is cleared, the LLP may register with the
59
Registrar of Companies. By this act of registration, the United
60
Kingdom LLP becomes a separate legal entity from its members.
The Limited Liability Partnerships Act (“LLPA”) requires at least
two members for incorporation, and the names of these members
61
must be listed on the registration. For creation, the LLP must
also disclose the intended place of the registered office of the
62
LLP. The registered office states the country within Great Britain
where the registered office is located, and the registered office
63
must be situated within the country of registration. A member or
agent/solicitor acting on the member’s behalf must sign the LLP’s
64
If all requirements are met, the
incorporation document.
Registrar of Companies will issue a certificate of incorporation
indicating the LLP’s date of incorporation, its registered number,
65
The LLP may commence
and its legal existence as an LLP.
66
business upon its incorporation.
3.

The Partnership AgreementTailoring the Investment

As with general partnership law, an LLP is not required to
adopt a written agreement regulating the internal relationship of
67
If the members do not submit their verbal
its members.
58. Companies Act, 1985, c. 6, § 28(2) (U.K.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1985/6/contents.
59. Limited Liability Partnerships Act, 2000, c. 12, § 3(1) (U.K.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/12/contents.
60. Id. § 1(2).
61. Id. § 2(1)(a). The disclosure of the names of members also requires the
indication of which members are designated members or non-designated
members. Id. § 2(2)(f). In general, designated members are obligated to appoint
an auditor, sign LLP documents, deliver accounts to the Registrar of Companies,
send notices of amendments to the certificate of incorporation to the Registrar of
Companies, prepare, sign, and file the LLP’s annual return, and to wind up and
dissolve the LLP if such is required. Id. §§ 8–9.
62. See id. § 2(2)(c).
63. See id. Thus, an LLP registered in England or Wales may not have its
registered office in Scotland and vice versa. DOUGLAS ARMOUR, TOLLEY’S LIMITED
LIABILITY PARTNERSHIPS: THE NEW LEGISLATION § 2.8, at 8 (2001).
64. See Limited Liability Partnerships Act, 2000, c. 12, § 2(1)(b) (U.K.),
available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/12/contents; ARMOUR,
supra note 63, § 2.5, at 5.
65. See Limited Liability Partnerships Act, 2000, c. 12, § 3 (U.K.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/12/contents.
66. See id. § 3(4); ARMOUR, supra note 63, § 2.4., at 4–5.
67. ARMOUR, supra note 63, § 2.5, at 5.
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understandings as to profits and losses as well as management in
writing, the LLP Regulations of 2000 set out default rules that
68
modify those of the Partnership Act of 1890. Thus, in the absence
of a written agreement, the default LLP provisions provide that:
(1) All members share equally in profits and losses;
(2) The LLP must indemnify members for expenses incurred
in relation to the LLP;
(3) All members must participate in management;
(4) Members are not entitled to remuneration for
management duties carried out for the LLP;
(5) All existing members agree to admit new members or to
the assignment of an interest in the LLP by a member;
(6) A member cannot be expelled without the express
agreement of all members;
(7) Business decisions will be made by majority unless the
decision is concerning a change in the nature of the
business, which requires consent of all members;
(8) All members have access to books and records of the LLP;
and
(9) Members cannot compete against the LLP without
69
consent of other members.
Neither the Scottish nor English Limited Liability Partnerships
Acts statutorily permit the elimination of the fiduciary duties of
70
care or loyalty by professionals. These Acts also do not contain
71
any stated public policy of “freedom of contract.” In addition, the
LLPA of 2000 adopted in England, Wales, and Scotland contains
no provision authorizing the elimination of the common law
fiduciary duties of care and non-competition owed by professionals
72
or others to clients or by professionals to each other. It would
appear, therefore, that the United Kingdom LLP is not as flexible
68. Id.
69. Id. A “typical” United Kingdom LLP agreement will cover the following
categories: nature of the LLP’s business; LLP’s name, property, and place of
business; banking; members’ shares and contributions; profits and losses; draws;
members’ duties; holiday entitlements; management; limits on members’
authority; admission of new members; indemnity; cars; insurance; retirement;
expulsion; termination/winding up; covenants; notices; and arbitration. Id. § 2.5,
app. 1.
70. Limited Liability Partnerships Regulations, 2001, S.I. 2001/1090, § 7
(U.K.), reprinted in ARMOUR, supra note 63, app. 2, at 123−24.
71. See Limited Liability Partnerships Act, 2000, c. 12 (U.K.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/12/contents.
72. Id.
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as the Delaware LLC on the issue of contractual modification or
elimination of duties imposed by statute or common law among
sophisticated parties in arm’s length transactions. However, in
practice in the United Kingdom, the “limitation” or “expansion” of
73
Rather,
fiduciary duties does not occur by statutory fiat.
practitioners use the memorandum of association or articles of
association and its detailed description of the entity’s purposes and
objectives to “tailor” fiduciary duties. Thus, by limiting a purpose
or objectives clause to primary social purpose and reducing wealth
maximization to a secondary objective, fiduciary duties are limited
as well.
In addition, the United Kingdom LLP apparently is broad
enough to allow the creation of a for-profit, for-benefit entity. In
other words, a United Kingdom LLP may be incorporated for any
74
“purpose” or “objective” that the members/investors desire.
Thereafter, the members, or the managing member, must
implement the express purpose set out in the memorandum of
association and articles of association for the benefit of the
corporate entity. The complexity of the management of this
United Kingdom entity is its overlay of fiduciary duties commonly
owed to equity holders operating in direct conflict with the express
nonprofit, socially-driven, beneficial purposes of the LLP. In short,
in the absence of the contractual ability to modify, tailor, or
eliminate conflicting profit-maximizing fiduciary duties, founders
(visionaries) and investors (capital founders) in the United
Kingdom LLP will always be at odds with each other at the outset.
Capital investors and foundations generally seek some form of
internal rate of return, whereas founding members may sacrifice
profit in order to achieve the social goal (e.g., providing renewable
energy sources to local neighborhoods). The United Kingdom
73. See Judith Freedman, Limited Liability Partnerships in the United Kingdom—
Do They Have a Role for Small Firms?, 26 J. CORP. L. 897, 902 (2001) (explaining that
the Limited Liability Partnerships Regulations set out default provisions for the
LLP but do not impose a duty of good faith and can be altered by the LLP
agreement). See generally Limited Liability Partnerships Act, 2000, c. 12 (U.K.),
available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/12/contents (containing
no language concerning expanding or limiting fiduciary duties).
74. Limited Liability Partnerships Act, 2000, c. 12, § 2 (U.K), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/12/contents (explaining that any two
or more persons associated for the carrying on of a lawful business with a view to
profit may form an LLP if they subscribe their names to an incorporation
document, which must be delivered to the registrar as statutorily specified). The
registrar will issue the certificate of incorporation if all is in order. Id. § 3.
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LLP attempts to address the socially-driven business equitably by
allowing contractual tailoring in the purpose clause, but thereafter
does not permit the contractual elimination or modification of the
duties owed to the conflicting financial interests in the
benefit/profit entity. In this sense, the United Kingdom LLP of
England, Scotland, and Wales goes far in inducing socially-driven
businesses but does not go far enough in protecting outside
investors.
B. The United Kingdom “Private Company”
1.

General Introduction—The Memorandum of Association

The United Kingdom Companies Act of 1985 provides in
pertinent part that:
(1) Any two or more persons associated for a lawful
purpose may, by subscribing their names to a
memorandum of association and otherwise complying
with the requirements of this Act in respect of
registration, form an incorporated company, with or
without limited liability.
(2) A company so formed may be either—
(a) a company having the liability of its members
limited by the memorandum to the amount, if any,
unpaid on the shares respectively held by them (“a
company limited by shares”);
(b) a company having the liability of its members
limited by the memorandum to such amount as the
members may respectively thereby undertake to
contribute to the assets of the company in the event
of its being wound up (“a company limited by
guarantee”); or
(c) a company not having any limit on the liability of
75
its members (“an unlimited company”).
75. Companies Act, 1985, c. 6, §§ 1, 2(a)–(c) (U.K.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1985/6/contents.
Since July 15, 1993,
pursuant to the European Community’s Twelfth Council Company Law Directive
on single-member private limited liability companies, a private limited company
may be formed with one person. See Companies (Single Member Private Limited
Companies) Regulations, 1992, S.I. 1992/1699, art. 2 (U.K.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/1992/1699/contents/made.
For more
information about the European Community’s Law Directive see Council Directive
89/667, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 40, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ
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Under the Companies Act, the memorandum of association is
often a lengthy public document setting forth in great detail its
purposes, object, and authority, including whether it is limited or
76
unlimited, or public or private. By striking contrast, the United
States certificate of incorporation normally presents a paucity of
77
The United
information regarding the filing corporation.
Kingdom memorandum of association may comprise as few as fifty
or as many as a hundred pages or more of public documentation
78
for the company’s formation. This memorandum of association is
the company’s “constitution,” which records the purposes for
which the entity is being incorporated and sets forth the
distribution of power within the company and its internal
79
procedural mechanisms.
Under the 1989 reform of the Companies Act, a United
Kingdom company could not make the argument that a contract
with a third party was ultra vires on the grounds that it was beyond
80
the purposes or object stated in its memorandum of association.
/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:1989L0667:20070101:EN:PDF.
76. See Companies Act, 1985, c. 6, §§ 1–3 (U.K), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1985/6/contents.
77. See, e.g., CORPORATE DOCUMENTS & PROCESS COMM. & CORPORATE LAW
COMM., A.B.A., PUB. CO. ORGANIZATIONAL DOCUMENTS: MODEL FORMS AND
COMMENTARY 57–74 (2009) (illustrating the scarcity of information required about
a filing corporation in a certificate of incorporation by showing an example of a
certificate of incorporation for Delaware).
78. See Companies (Tables A to F) Regulations, 1985, S.I. 2007/2826 (U.K.)
(amended 2007), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2007/2826
/contents/made (outlining the requirements and form of memoranda of
association under United Kingdom Companies Act).
79. In like manner, in Delaware it is widely understood that a certificate of
incorporation is a “contract” between the corporation, state, and its stockholders,
as well as between the corporation and its stockholders “inter sese.” See Morris v.
Am. Pub. Utils. Co., 122 A. 696, 700 (Del. Ch. 1923). In addition, the Delaware
Code provides:
In addition to the matters required to be set forth in the certificate of
incorporation by subsection (a) of this section, the certificate of
incorporation may also contain any or all of the following matters:
(1) Any provision for the management of the business and for the
conduct of the affairs of the corporation, and any provision creating,
defining, limiting and regulating the powers of the corporation, the
directors, and the stockholders, or any class of the stockholders, or
the . . . members . . . of a nonstock corporation; if such provisions
are not contrary to the laws of this State. Any provision which is
required or permitted by any section of this chapter to be stated in
the bylaws may instead be stated in the certificate of incorporation.
DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(1) (2010).
80. Companies Act, 1985, c. 6, § 35 (U.K.), as superseded by Companies Act,
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Thus, it is the duty of the directors of a United Kingdom company
to know and act within the limitations of the memorandum of
81
association.
In 2006, the Companies Act was modernized and the
82
memorandum of association re-defined. Under section 8 of the
Companies Act 2006, the memorandum of association is defined as:
“a memorandum stating that the subscribers—(a) wish to form a
company under this Act, and (b) agree to become members of the
company and, in the case of a company that is to have a share
83
capital, to take at least one share each.” The policy of the new
definition is to shift the emphasis from the memorandum of
association of a limited company being the document that details
the purposes and objects of the company to the articles of
84
association. In this manner, the formative document remains the
combination of the memorandum of association and the articles of
association, but only the articles of association become the
“constitution” of the company under the reformed Act.
2.

The Articles of Association—Tailoring the Investment

Whereas the memorandum of association before set forth a
company’s purposes, objects, authority, internal structure, and
nature, the articles of association provided for the internal
management of the company, including any limitations on the

1989, c. 40, § 108(1) (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga
/1985/6/contents (“The validity of an act done by a company shall not be called
into question on the ground of lack of capacity by reason of anything in the
company’s memorandum.”).
81. Companies Act, 1989, c. 40, § 108(3) (U.K.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1985/6/contents (“It remains the duty of
the directors to observe any limitations on their powers flowing from the
company’s memorandum; and action by the directors which but for subsection (1)
would be beyond the company’s capacity may only be ratified by the company by
special resolution. A resolution ratifying such action shall not affect any liability
incurred by the directors or any other person; relief from any such liability must
be agreed to separately by special resolution.”).
82. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, Introduction (U.K.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/contents (“An Act to reform
company law and restate the greater part of the enactments relating to companies
. . . .”).
83. Id. § 8.
84. See id. § 8, nn. 32–34 (noting that, in the future, “key information
regarding the internal allocation of powers between the directors and members of
a company will be set out in one place: the articles of association”).
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85

powers of directors as agents for the company. A company could
86
If a
register its articles of association at Companies House.
company was limited by shares, it could choose to not register its
articles of association, in which case “Table A” of the Companies
Act applied to the company to the extent provisions in the table
87
were not excluded by the company.
With the 2006 reforms, the articles of association now must be
88
filed with the memorandum of association. The articles must set
89
forth the internal regulation of the company. The articles may
also set out “provisions for entrenchment” that require
modification or amendment procedures or conditions that are
more restrictive than those necessary for a special resolution. The
articles may not, however, limit or eliminate managerial liability for
negligence or breach of duty since such provisions would be
90
deemed void under section 232 of the Companies Act 2006.
Under the prior law, the legal effect of the memorandum and
the articles of association, when registered, was that the company
and its members were bound “to the same extent as if they
91
respectively had been signed and sealed by each member.” The
memorandum and articles, like the United States certificate of
incorporation, constituted a contract between the members and
92
Under this
the company and between the members inter se.
85. See id. § 2.
86. See id. § 7. See generally GBF1 Company Formation, COS. HOUSE, (Nov. 2007),
http://www.companieshouse.gov.uk/about/pdf/ca_gbf1.pdf (summarizing the
procedural requirements for forming a company under the Companies Act 2006).
87. Companies Act, 1985, c. 6, § 8(2), Table A (U.K.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1985/6/contents.
88. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 8 (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation
.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/contents; id. § 9 (stating that when registering, the
application must be delivered to the registrar together with a memorandum of
association and, among other things, a copy of any proposed articles of
association); id. § 18.
89. Id.
90. Id. § 232.
91. Companies Act, 1985, chapter 6, section 14(1) (U.K.) provides:
Subject to the provisions of this Act, the memorandum and articles, when
registered, bind the company and its members to the same extent as if
they respectively had been signed and sealed by each member, and
contained covenants on the part of each member to observe all the
provisions of the memorandum and of the articles.
92. See Hickman v. Kent or Romney Marsh Sheepbreeders Ass’n, [1915] 1 Ch.
881, [903] (Eng.) (stating that general articles dealing with the rights of members
should be “treated as a statutory agreement between them and the company as
well as between themselves inter se”); supra note 79 and accompanying text
(discussing a certificate of incorporation acting as a contract).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol38/iss2/1

22

Conaway: The Global Use of the Delaware Limited Liability Company for Soci

794

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:2

contractual theory, a member could enforce a “personal” right
such as a right to a dividend or a voting right. An “outside” right—
such as the right of a member to be a director or a solicitor for the
company—was only enforceable by the company and not by the
93
member personally. In sum, the contractual rights of members
provided by the memorandum or articles were enforceable by
members personally only if those claims involve rights or
obligations of members qua members. The articles could be
modified or amended by the members “bona fide” if it was in the
interest of the company. Both amendment and modification
94
Because the
required a majority vote or unanimous consent.
articles constitute a contractual right, the members could vote in
their self-interest in determining the company’s “best interest.”
The contractual effect of section 14 of the Companies Act and
its ensuing case law has been the target of great academic debate in
95
the United Kingdom. Despite great consideration for reform by
the United Kingdom Law Commission to move section 20 from a
contractual basis to a statutory one, the Law Commission instead
suggested a careful definition of “personal” rights under a
96
memorandum and articles.
Under the reform of 2006, the articles of association and any
97
resolutions or agreements create the constitution of the company.
New companies formed in England, Wales, Northern Ireland, and
Scotland are subject to the reform version of the Companies Act

93. See Hickman, 1 Ch. at 896–97.
94. Companies Act, 1985, c. 6, § 9 (U.K.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1985/6/contents; see also Allen v. Gold
Reefs of W. Afr. Ltd., [1900] 1 A.C. 656, [671] (Eng.) (stating that articles can be
altered and will be binding if they are “bona fide for the benefit of the company”).
95. For an overview of the debate, see K.W. Wedderburn, Shareholders’ Rights
and the Rule in Foss v. Harbottle, 15 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 194 (1957) (advocating
personal contractual rights for everything except provisions identified as
procedural only). See also G.D. Goldberg, The Enforcement of Outsider Rights under
Section 20 (1) of the Companies Act of 1948, 35 MOD. L. REV. 362 (1972) (advocating
that a member has the contractual right to have any of the affairs of the company
conducted as set forth in the memorandum and articles); Graham. N. Prentice,
The Enforcement of Outsider Rights, 1 CO. LAWYER 179, 184 (1980) (stating that
personal rights should only have contractual power if the provision is “definitive”
to the power of the company).
96. ANNOTATED COMPANIES LEGISLATION 314 (John Birds et al. eds., 2010)
(defining personal rights as “rights which are enforceable under the statutory
contract”).
97. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 17 (U.K.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/contents.
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98

3.

The Limited Company—Reflections for Social Responsibility

The United Kingdom limited company clearly has the
contractual flexibility in its memorandum of association and
articles of association to adopt a for-benefit, for-profit purpose for
an existing or new socially-driven business. It is apparent, though,
that the limited company suffers the “transparency” burden of overdisclosure. Under the United Kingdom disclosure guidelines, not
only will unnecessary information be disclosed in the
memorandum of association, but the company will also be taxed
with mandatory fiduciary duties, auditor controls, and adherence
99
to insolvency and director disqualification statutes.
As for fiduciary duties, the United Kingdom limited company
differs from the traditional United States corporation. In the
United States, directors are statutory managers of the corporation
and owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to shareholders and the
100
In the United Kingdom, directors act as
corporate enterprise.
agents of the corporation and their duties of care and loyalty run to
101
In this
the company rather than to the company’s members.
manner, a United Kingdom limited company has more flexibility to
create a “hybrid” nature with directors’ duties following the
purpose and objective of the company. Yet, the oddity of U.K. law
is that this paradigm necessarily sets constituencies with adverse
financial interests at odds with each other. Directors of socially
responsible, for-profit United Kingdom limited companies are
98. Id. §§ 1–6.
99. Id. §§ 82–85.
100. The board of directors in a U.S. corporation is vested with original
statutory authority to manage the business and affairs of the corporation. See, e.g.,
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2010). In a jurisdiction such as Delaware, the
directors must manage the corporation in accordance with the common law
fiduciary duties of care and loyalty. Stone ex rel. Am. S. Bancorp. v. Ritter, 911
A.2d 362, 369–70 (Del. 2006) (holding that the obligation to act in “good faith” is
not an independent fiduciary duty but is a “subsidiary element” of the duty of
loyalty). Therefore, a contractual modification of a certificate of incorporation to
add “stakeholders” beyond shareholders would reasonably create contractual
(potentially third-party beneficiary) rights but would not necessarily create
fiduciary duties or standing to the specified stakeholders, including members of
the community or the environment at large. An independent statute would
require this type of judicial recognition but, even then, such an act would not strip
the judiciary of their “equitable” powers to “do justice.”
101. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, §§ 171–177 (U.K.), available at http://www
.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/contents.
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tasked with sorting and implementing the purposes, however
mismatched financially, set forth in the company’s memorandum
102
of association or articles of association.
C. The B or Beneficial Corporation
1.

General Introduction
103

The B, or Beneficial, Corporation is the brainchild of B Lab,
a nonprofit corporation established in 2006 and based in Berwyn,
104
In a nutshell, the concept of B Lab is that a
Pennsylvania.
company should be able to “do good” and “give back” to the
community, customers, suppliers, and the environment without
concern about shareholder suits for failure to maximize
105
Although B Lab is itself organized
shareholder value at all costs.
as a nonprofit corporation, the concept B Lab espouses is a new
type of corporation that would require: (1) an amendment to a
company’s articles of incorporation stating that it is a beneficial
corporation whose purpose is to maximize the interests of the
106
company’s “stakeholders,” including its employees, customers,
102. Id. § 171(a).
103. Currently there are 454 B Corporations in fifty-four different industries,
with $2.18 billion in revenue and $1 million in annual savings. About Certified B
Corps, B LAB, http://www.bcorporation.net/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2011).
104. See Lessons to be Learned, supra note 21, at 793 n.12.
105. A business’s focus on all constituencies of a company as well as on
accomplishing a socially responsible purpose is often referred to as the “triple
bottom line.” See Carolina Miranda, Human Capital: The “People” Part of the Triple
Bottom Line, CULTIVATING CAPITAL (July 8, 2011), http://www.cultivatingcapital
.com/category/triple-bottom-line.
106. The theory of “stakeholder” interests in a corporation is not new to
corporate law. For example, in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,
506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986), the Delaware Supreme Court noted that, in the context
of a hostile tender offer, a board of directors might be warranted in considering
the interests of note holders in addition to those of stockholders. Id. at 182 (citing
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985)). Although
this language in Revlon was dicta by the court and was never repeated in another
Delaware Supreme Court case, an investor could file a certificate of incorporation
today in Delaware that adopted a “beneficial” purpose and the Secretary of State’s
Office would accept that filing. However, because Delaware never adopted a
“constituency” statute, the legal question presented by such a filing is: What duties
would Delaware directors owe to the employees, creditors, community, and
environment? Under Delaware’s common law, it would seem that the certificate
could not create fiduciary duties to anyone but shareholders. The open question
is whether the purpose clause is broad enough to create third-party beneficiary
rights in the “constituencies” thus named. Another issue is the application of the
business judgment rule to the decisions by Delaware directors where the certificate
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suppliers, the community in which it operates, and the
107
environment; and (2) a certification by B Lab that the company
108
is a B Corporation.
2.

Formation and Management

The B Corporation, as a new type of entity, requires a separate
109
One recently enacted statute
corporate statute for its formation.
110
Under the Vermont Benefit
is that found in Vermont.
Corporation Act, a benefit corporation is formed when its articles
of incorporation are either filed or amended to include the
111
In
statement: “This corporation is a benefit corporation.”
addition, a benefit corporation must exist for a “general public
benefit” as defined by having “a material positive impact on society
and the environment, as measured by a third-party standard,
through activities that promote some combination of specific
112
A specific public benefit is defined under the
public benefits.”
113
Any amendment of the
Vermont Benefit Corporation Act.
has broadened the scope of “stakeholders.” See Lessons to Be Learned, supra note 21,
at 794–95 & nn.16–17.
107. See Understand Legal, B CORPORATION, http://www.bcorporation.net
/become/legal (last visited Oct. 11, 2011).
108. Only B Lab can “certify” that a company is a legitimate B Corporation,
providing quite a boon for B Lab. Become a B Corporation, B CORPORATION,
http://www.bcorporation.net/become (last visited Oct. 11, 2011). For this service
B Lab receives one-tenth of one percent of the corporation’s annual revenue. See
Hannah Clark Steiman, A New Kind of Company: A “B” Corporation, INC.COM (July 1,
2007), http://www.inc.com/magazine/20070701/priority-a-new-kind-of-company
.html. If a company is not seeking certification, access to the metrics of
compliance is free. The B Impact Rating System, B CORPORATION, http://www.
bcorporation.net/become/BRS (last visited Oct. 6, 2011). B Lab generally rates a
new company on five factors—community, consumers, employees, environment,
and leadership. See Lessons to be Learned, supra note 21, at 793 n.12.
109. Four states presently have B Corporation statutes: Maryland, New Jersey,
Vermont, and Virginia. See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS §§ 5-6C-01 to -08
(West 2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-1 to -11 (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A,
§§ 21.01 to .14 (2011); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-782 to -791 (2011). Other states
have introduced legislation regarding B Corporations. See, e.g., S.B. 1462, 26th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2011).
110. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.01 to .14 (2011).
111. Id. § 21.03(a)(1) (defining a benefit corporation).
112. Id. § 21.03(a)(4).
113. See id. § 21.03(a)(6)(A)–(G) (“[A specific public benefit includes:] (A)
providing low income or underserved individuals or communities with beneficial
products or services; (B) promoting economic opportunity for individuals or
communities beyond the creation of jobs in the normal course of business; (C)
preserving or improving the environment; (D) improving human health; (E)
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articles of incorporation to add, amend, or delete a specific public
benefit requires a two-thirds vote of the outstanding shares of the
114
benefit corporation.
Once the benefit corporation is formed, its management is
similar to that of the traditional board of directors, with one
115
The primary
exception: the addition of a “benefit director.”
purpose of the benefit director is to file the annual “benefit report”
that states whether or not the directors of the benefit corporation
have complied with their general and specific public benefit
116
purposes.
Non-benefit directors must act in the best interests of the
benefit corporation, including:
(A) the shareholders of the benefit corporation; (B) the
employees and workforce of the benefit corporation and
its subsidiaries and suppliers; (C) the interests of
customers to the extent they are beneficiaries of the
general or specific public benefit purposes of the benefit
corporation; (D) community and societal considerations,
including those of any community in which offices or
facilities of the benefit corporation or its subsidiaries or
suppliers are located; (E) the local and global
environment; and (F) the long-term and short-term
interests of the benefit corporation, including the
possibility that those interests may be best served by the
117
continued independence of the benefit corporation.
The board of directors of the benefit corporation is not
required to give priority to any specific constituency of the
118
corporation. The directors of a benefit corporation are not held
to a “different or higher standard of care when an action or
119
inaction might affect control of the benefit corporation.”
Directors do not owe fiduciary duties to all designated beneficiaries

promoting the arts or sciences or the advancement of knowledge; (F) increasing
the flow of capital to entities with a public benefit purpose; and (G) the
accomplishment of any other identifiable benefit for society or the
environment.”).
114. Id. § 21.08(e).
115. Id. § 21.10.
116. Id. § 21.10(c)(3)(A).
117. Id. § 21.09(a)(1)(A)–(F).
118. Id. § 21.09(a)(3) (providing that the board of directors is not required to
give preference to any particular person or group unless the articles of
incorporation have designated a priority among the stakeholders).
119. Id. § 21.09(a)(4).
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under the corporation’s articles of incorporation merely because
the person is a beneficiary of a general or specific beneficial
120
Instead, directors only owe fiduciary duties to those
purpose.
who may bring a benefit enforcement proceeding against the
121
An enforcement proceeding may be
benefit corporation.
brought by: (1) a shareholder who otherwise had that right; (2) a
director; (3) a person or group of persons owning ten percent or
more in an entity of which the beneficial corporation is a
subsidiary; or (4) those persons named in the articles of
122
incorporation.
3.

Certification

The Vermont Act, unlike the B Lab paradigm, does not
require a “certification” for the formation of a benefit
123
Rather, in assessing the compliance of the
corporation.
corporation with its beneficial purposes, the benefit director, in the
annual benefit report, must apply a “third-party standard” of
124
The “third-party standard” is defined in the
performance.
Vermont Act as: “[A] recognized standard for defining, reporting,
and assessing corporate social and environmental performance
that . . . (A) is developed by a person that is independent of the
benefit corporation; and (B) is transparent because the . . .
125
information about the standard is publicly available.”
The B Lab system requires a corporation to score “40 out of
100 on a survey B Lab developed after consulting with more than
126
Some of the
150 entrepreneurs, investors, and academics.”
criteria that gain points for potential B Corporation candidates
include “democratic decision making, having good benefits,
127
donating profits to charity, and being energy efficient.”
However, the B Lab certification monopoly has not gained uniform
128
acceptance among founders of socially-driven businesses.
For example, in the organic farming industry, some have
120.
121.
122.
123.
§ 21.05.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. § 21.09(e).
Id.; see also id. § 21.13(a).
Id. § 21.13(b)(1)–(4).
See supra text accompanying notes 111–14; see also VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A,
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.14(d)(2).
Id. § 21.03(a)(8).
See Steiman, supra note 108.
Id.
Id.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol38/iss2/1

28

Conaway: The Global Use of the Delaware Limited Liability Company for Soci

800

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:2

alleged that the “organic certification system” is “somewhat
suspect” and “has actually weakened their movement by enabling
129
the creation of organic factory farms.” Some of the questions on
130
B Lab’s survey have dubious relevance or social value. All sociallydriven businesses are not created equally, nor are their purposes
equally “certifiable.” As in the Vermont Act, a third-party annual
review of compliance with “benefit” objectives is a logically better
indicia of how well a socially responsible business is performing on
an annual basis than a single source “certification” made in a “onesize-fits-all” package.
4.

The Truth About Benefit Corporations

Just as the “agile virtual corporation” set “best practices”
131
standards fifteen years ago, the benefit corporation may well be
in search of standards today. Yet, it is nonsensical to assume that
only B Lab can provide “certification” for all beneficial, socially
132
First, B Lab assumes that the corporate
responsible businesses.
form is the subliminal choice of entity for socially-driven
133
Yet, with the corporate form comes a statutory
organizations.
board of directors, officers, other mandatory compliance
requirements, and over one hundred years of ingrained common
law application of traditional fiduciary concepts, including the
bedrock governance principle that directors must maximize
shareholder wealth in the best interest of the corporate enterprise.
With such a well-established, traditionally-based statutory
infrastructure, one must immediately wonder why B Lab chose this
bastion of corporateness as its target for implementing
“stakeholder” interests. In Delaware alone, B Lab need only have
looked to the most popular Delaware entity being formed today—
that of the limited liability company (LLC)—and virtually all of its
129. Id.
130. Id. One example of such a question: “Are corporate events or teambuilding exercises held at least twice annually?” Id.
131. Ann E. Conaway Stilson, The Agile Virtual Corporation, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L.
497, 499 n.11 (1997) (describing the purpose and scope of re-engineering
businesses in an evolving global economy).
132. Another nonprofit organization, the Natural Capital Institute, is
developing a standard for “responsible business” that will be launched soon.
Steiman, supra note 108.
133. B Corporation Declaration of Interdependence, CERTIFIED B CORPORATION
(2008), http://www.bcorporation.net/resources/bcorp/documents/Bcorp_SM
_Declaration.pdf.
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impediments would disappear. So why a B Corporation?
First, B Lab itself is organized as a nonprofit corporation in
134
However, in order to “sell” “doing good” and
Pennsylvania.
“giving back” to private investors in a down economy, B Lab needs
a vehicle that can blend nonprofit and profit characteristics. The
form in which B Lab is organized cannot work because as a
nonprofit all monies are distributed to the company and not its
135
Pennsylvania does not presently have a benefit
members.
corporation statute so a “new” form of entity would have to be
136
created if the corporate form were to be retained. In this story, it
appears that the marketing of a B Corporation got ahead of the
legal practicalities (or more logically stated, the legal morass of the
B Corporation). In hindsight, the founders of B Lab would have
been well-advised to abandon the B Corporation moniker and
instead seek out the best choice of entity for their platform.
In short, the B Corporation of B Lab origination is overly
paternalistic as well as structurally unsound. The entity envisioned
by B Lab is inflexible with its corporate infrastructure, overly broad
with its “constituency” purpose clause, and legally uncertain with its
attempt by contract law to usurp over one hundred years of
corporate fiduciary duty law.
Certainly, the social and
environmental development sought by B Lab is laudable. However,
the same result is more readily attained and legally defensible by
the contractually created LLC. By trying to fit “benefit” into more
than one hundred years of corporate common law, B Lab is
hammering the proverbial square peg into a round hole—an
endeavor that causes much frenzy, but guarantees no return on the
investment.
As for statutory attempts such as that in Vermont, the “benefit”
entity remains inflexible with its corporate structure and its added
137
Notwithstanding the Vermont
feature of a “benefit” director.
Act’s attempt to define the benefit corporation directors’ duties
134. Jay Coen Gilbert, Remarks on White/Leach Benefit Corporation Bill Upon
Introduction to the Pennsylvania State Senate (Feb. 7, 2011), available at
http://www.bcorporation.net/resources/bcorp/documents/B%20Lab%20remar
ks_PA_020711.pdf.
135. Ferdinand S. Tinio, Annotation, Distribution of Funds by Nonprofit
Corporation Absent Dissolution, 51 A.L.R.3d 1318 (1973).
136. The Pennsylvania Legislature is currently contemplating legislation to
recognize B Corporations as a legal entity. S.B. 433, 195th Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Pa. 2011).
137. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 21.12 (2011).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol38/iss2/1

30

Conaway: The Global Use of the Delaware Limited Liability Company for Soci

802

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:2

with respect to whom may bring a claim, it seems inequitable that
corporate law would create a “stakeholder” entity that permits no
138
protection for those very “stakeholders.” In addition, if a benefit
corporation is statutorily established for a primarily social purpose,
then in “equity” or “fairness” it seems that a court would hold
directors liable for failure to exercise care and loyalty in seeking to
achieve that primary goal rather than shareholder wealth
maximization. If the goal is to relieve directors of liability in
benefit corporations, then states adopting benefit legislation must
be willing to provide for statutory elimination of directorial duties
to non-traditional “stakeholder” interests. Due to the paucity of
statutory authority to eliminate fiduciary duties, courts will certainly
rely upon their equitable powers to “do equity” and “impose
fairness” in appropriate cases. For these reasons alone, the B
Corporation is a legal nightmare.
D. The “L3C” or Low-Profit Limited Liability Company
1.

General Background

The “L3C,” or “low-profit limited liability company,” came
139
The L3C is another hybrid
onto the new entity scene in 2008.
social entrepreneur organization that attempts to blend “program
related investments,” or PRIs, with some small degree of income
140
In the field of renewable
production for private foundations.
energy technologies, startup companies need significant funding
sources. One obvious beginning path is founder capital. Once this
base is tapped, venture capital or foundations become important
138. The constituency acts were not enacted with benefit corporations in
mind, but rather to fend off hostile takeovers—a distinctly different concern than
that being pursued by B Lab. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-1202(A) (2010); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 33-756 (2010); FLA. STAT. § 607.0830(3) (2010); HAW. REV. STAT. § 414221 (2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-1-602 (2010); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8.85
(2010); IND. CODE § 23-1-35-1 (2010); IOWA CODE § 490.1108A (2010); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 271B.12-210(4) (West 2010); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12.92(G) (1994); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-C, § 831 (2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156B, § 65 (2010);
MINN. STAT. § 302A.251 (2010); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-4-8.30(d) (2010); MO. REV.
STAT. § 351.347 (2010); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2045(1) (2010); N.J. REV. STAT. §14A:61 (West 2010); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-35(D) (2001); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717(b)
(Consol. 2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(E) (West 2010); OR. REV. STAT. §
60.357(5) (2010); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1715-16 (2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-5.2-8(a)
(2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-33-4 (2010); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-18-301 (2010);
WIS. STAT. § 180.0827 (2010); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-16-830 (2010).
139. Callison & Vestal, supra note 23, at 273.
140. Id. at 282–83.
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resources. Foundations often have excess funds that will be subject
141
to an excise tax if not invested. These funds may be invested and
142
A PRI
receive beneficial tax treatment if they qualify as a PRI.
must meet three requirements under the Internal Revenue Code:
(1) “The primary purpose of the investment is to accomplish one
or more of” the specified requirements (religious, scientific,
educational, literary, or charitable); (2) “No significant purpose of
the investment is the production of income or the appreciation of
property”; and (3) “No purpose of the investment” is to influence
143
legislation or to participate in political campaigns.
In the renewable energy sector, a foundation could qualify for
a PRI under the Treasury definition so long as the primary purpose
of the investment was to further the scientific objective of
advancing research, development, and implementation of solar
and wind energy in a particular sector, and this was a primary goal
144
If the company also
of the foundation’s investment objective.
had private investors with the objective of receiving a return on
their investment, the motive of the private investors should not
145
affect the PRI so long as the PRI was below-market.
2.

The Vermont Act
146

Vermont was the first jurisdiction to adopt an L3C statute.
According to the Vermont Act, an L3C is described to mirror the
147
Therefore, a
federal definition of a program-related investment.
Vermont L3C must: (1) significantly further the accomplishment of
a charitable or educational purpose within the meaning of the
Internal Revenue Code and would not be formed but for the
objective of accomplishing such purpose; (2) no significant
purpose of the L3C is the production of income or the
141. Id. at 276–79 (setting forth the various excise taxes on foundations
regarding charitable gifts).
142. Id.
143. Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3(a)(1)(2011).
144. See id.
145. Id. § 53.4944-3(b) ex. 5.
146. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27) (2010). Other jurisdictions with L3C
legislation include: Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, North Carolina, Utah,
and Wyoming. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/1-26 (2010); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
12:1302(C) (2010); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 31 § 1611 (2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS §
450.4102(m) (2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-2-01(d) (2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 482c-412 (2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-102(a)(ix)(2010).
147. Compare VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27)(A), with Treas. Reg. § 53.49443(2)(i).
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appreciation of property; and (3) no purpose of the company is to
accomplish a political or legislative purpose or goal as defined in
148
Next, the certificate of formation
the Internal Revenue Code.
must indicate that the company is an L3C and the name must bear
149
Finally, if the L3C ceases to satisfy the
the designation, “L3C.”
requirements for an L3C, the company defaults to an LLC and
150
must amend its certificate to indicate this change in status.
3.

The Truth About L3C Legislation

The obvious difficulty with the Vermont Act is that it does not
151
even require a “purposes” clause in the articles of organization.
Thus, unlike the B Corporation, there is no clear mechanism in the
statute whereby investors or outsiders can gauge whether the L3C is
in compliance with its stated literary, educational, scientific,
152
Also, the Vermont Act places
charitable, or religious objectives.
no mandate on the members of the L3C to file a “compliance with
153
The
benefits objectives” through a third-party annual review.
Vermont L3C simply comes into existence by stating that it is such
in the articles of organization and thereafter utilizes the required
154
L3C designation. For private investors, the L3C appellation is no
guarantee that the LLC will operate any differently than a standard
155
For foundations seeking PRIs, federal
limited liability company.
law mandates supervision of and compliance with investment
156
State acts such as that in Vermont do not further the
standards.
157
cause for private foundation funding.
The L3C proponents have been successful in lobbying for
legislation without fully balancing all options available for private
foundation funding or the confusion, ambiguity, and possible
misrepresentation caused by state legislation in this area without
parallel federal tax legislation. Certainly, private letter rulings
148. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27)(A)–(C).
149. Id. §§ 3026(a)(6), 3005(a)(2).
150. Id. § 2001(27)(D).
151. See supra Part III.B.1.
152. See supra Part III.C.2.
153. See supra Part III.C.3.
154. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27)(A)-(D).
155. See supra Part III.B.1.
156. See Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3 (2011).
157. See Callison & Vestal, supra note 23, at 282–86 (“[B]y focusing on the
LLC’s profit motivation, the Vermont statute arguably eviscerates L3Cs as a
method for attracting capital and encouraging beneficial economic growth.”).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2012

33

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 1

2012]

GLOBAL USE OF THE DELAWARE LLC

805

158

make clear that these L3C acts are unnecessary. In a 2006 private
letter ruling involving an LLC, where a foundation made an
investment in businesses in low-income communities owned or
controlled by members of minority or other disadvantaged groups
who were unable to secure reasonable traditional financing for the
purpose of community benefits, the question was raised whether
159
In a favorable
the foundation investment constituted a PRI.
ruling, the Internal Revenue Service examined the foundation’s
mission, objectives, and goals, which included aiding groups to
achieve economic and educational independence and giving back
to low-income communities, and concluded that the investment
160
mirrored the foundation’s charitable and educational purposes.
In this case, the fund would only invest if the business had been
denied traditional financing and sixty-seven percent of the owners
or controllers of the business were in fact members of
161
Thus, an L3C was not necessary to the
disadvantaged groups.
162
success of using an LLC for PRI investments. What is necessary is
that the investment matches the mission and objectives of the
foundation and the operating agreement reflects that mission.
4.

The Problem with Statutory Fiduciary Duties

The Vermont Act tracks many of the uniform unincorporated
acts by setting forth mandatory fiduciary duties of care and
163
loyalty. The duty of care, which is not actually a “fiduciary duty,”
requires that a member or manager not act in a grossly negligent
164
or reckless manner or with intent to do harm or commit fraud.
This so-called fiduciary duty of care is actually a mere standard of
accountability and has now been labeled as such by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in its newly165
The
revised Harmonized Uniform Business Organization Code.
158. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
159. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2006-10-020, at 1–3, 18 (Mar. 10, 2006).
160. Id. at 3, 24–35.
161. Id. at 8.
162. Id. at 4, 35 (concluding that the foundation’s contributions to a fund
organized as an LLC “qualify as a program-related investment”).
163. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3059(a)–(c) (2011).
164. See HARMONIZED UNIF. BUS. ORG. CODE § 409(c) (2011) (“The duty of care
of a member of a member-managed limited liability company in the conduct or
winding up of the company’s activities and affairs is to refrain from engaging in
grossly negligent or reckless conduct, intentional misconduct, or a knowing
violation of law.”).
165. See id.
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duty of loyalty, on the other hand, requires that members or
managers not take LLC property without the consent of other
members, not act in a manner adverse to the LLC, and not take an
166
opportunity or compete with the LLC in certain circumstances.
As with the B Corporation, these traditional fiduciary duties
“work” where the only “stakeholders” are members, managers, or
167
On the other
others set out in the LLC operating agreement.
hand, the fiduciary duties of “care and loyalty” were inserted into
the LLC acts based upon a presumption that the common law of
partnerships and limited partnerships was somehow applicable to
the new, hybrid LLC. That presumption fails if the purpose of an
L3C is to expand the “stakeholders” of the business beyond that
intended by the original LLC acts. Arguably, the better approach is
that in Delaware and jurisdictions that follow a statutory policy of
“freedom of contract,” rather than implication of fiduciary duties,
since under the Delaware approach, parties are free to draft any
duties desired in order to tailor them to the nature of the
enterprise as well as the investors and the investments. At present,
the Vermont Act serves only to set non-traditional “stakeholders”
with opposite financial interests at odds with one another. The Act
grants no flexibility for sophisticated investors to remove counterproductive duties where necessary.
E. The Delaware Limited Liability Company (LLC)
1.

General Background and History

Delaware adopted the Delaware Limited Liability Company
168
Act (“DLLCA”) in 1992 as the last of its unincorporated entity
169
When the DLLCA was enacted, the statute contained
statutes.
the language that permitted each Delaware unincorporated entity
to:
(1) expand or restrict duties (including fiduciary duties)
owed by a person or partner to each other or to the entity,
166. See VT. STAT. tit. 11, § 3059(b)(1)–(3).
167. See, e.g., id. § 3060 (noting permitted actions by “members”).
168. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-101 to -1109 (2010) (Delaware Limited
Liability Company Act).
169. See, for example, Delaware’s other unincorporated acts, id. §§ 15-101 to 1210 (2010) (Delaware Revised Uniform Partnership Act enacted in 1999); id. §§
17-101 to -1111 (2010) (Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act
enacted in 1973); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 3801–3826 (2010) (Delaware Statutory
Trust Act enacted in 1988).
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provided that the private organic agreement did not
“eliminate the implied contractual covenant of good faith
170
and fair dealing” ;
(2) limit or eliminate the liability of a partner or other person
to each other or to the entity for breach of contract or
breach of fiduciary duty, provided that no exculpation
could be granted in a private organic document for any
act or omission that constituted “a bad faith violation of
the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair
171
dealing” ; and
(3) exculpate a partner or other person that is a party to the
entity’s private organic document or is otherwise bound
by that agreement for breach of fiduciary duty, where
such person relies in good faith upon the terms of the
172
private organic document.
In 2004, the Delaware General Assembly amended the
language “expand or restrict” when used to delineate the
contractual parameter of “duties,” to clearly include the term
173
Although some found the 2004 amendments
“eliminate.”
surprising, in retrospect the amendments simply mirrored
Delaware’s stated public policy in its unincorporated entity law that
“[i]t is the policy of this chapter to give the maximum effect to the
principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of
174
limited liability company agreements.”
The obvious benefit of the Delaware LLC is that the entity
170. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c); see also id. § 15-103(f) (2010)
(permitting a partnership agreement to limit or eliminate “any and all liabilities
for breach of contract and breach of duties”); id. § 17-1101(d) (permitting a
partner’s duties to be expanded, restricted, or eliminated by a limited partnership
agreement); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3806(c) (permitting a trustee’s duties to be
expanded, restricted, or eliminated by the governing instrument).
171. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(e); see also id. § 15-103(f) (providing that
a partnership agreement may not limit or eliminate liability for a bad faith act or
omission); id. § 17-1101(f) (providing that a limited partnership agreement may
not limit or eliminate liability for a bad faith act or omission); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
12, § 3806(e) (providing that a governing instrument may not limit or eliminate
liability for a bad faith act or omission).
172. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 15-103(f) (permitting the elimination of fiduciary
duties in general partnerships); id. § 17-1101(d) (permitting the elimination of
fiduciary duties in limited partnerships); id. § 18-1101(c) (permitting the
elimination of fiduciary duties in LLCs); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3806(c)
(permitting the elimination of fiduciary duties in statutory trusts).
173. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-1101(c), 17-1101(d), 15-103(f); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 12, § 3806(c).
174. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b).
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175

generally avoids entity level taxation. Next, Delaware LLCs enjoy
significant contractual flexibility that permits sponsors to create a
private or public entity and to install any managerial infrastructure
176
that reflects the dynamics of the nature and purposes of the LLC.
This internal malleability also extends to founders and investors to
177
craft noneconomic equity interests or to eliminate voting rights
178
of some members if desired. In addition, a public LLC is subject
to different rules and regulations than corporations under the
stock exchanges as well as the federal securities laws—rules that
significantly affect the internal governance of the entity and the
179
rights of owners/investors. The 2004 amendments to Delaware’s
unincorporated entity acts authorized sponsors and investors to
contractually limit or eliminate duties and liabilities of owners or
managers to each other, the entity, or another person that is a
party to the entity’s private agreement. Additionally, Delaware’s
175. See Lessons to be Learned, supra note 21, at 790. Unincorporated entities are
today classified for tax purposes under the “check-the-box” tax regulations. Treas.
Reg. § 301.7701-2 to -3 (2010). Under the “check-the-box” regulations an “eligible
entity” is a business organization for federal tax purposes that is not treated as a
trust and is not mandated to be treated as a corporation for taxation treatment.
Id. § 301.7701-2. If the organization has a sole owner, it may be classified as a
disregarded entity; if it has two or more owners, it may elect partnership tax
treatment; or, as a corporation regardless of the number of owners. Id. §
301.7701-2 to -3. The “check-the-box” “election” is made by the taxpayer on Form
8832. Id. § 301.7701-3(c)(1)(i).
176. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b) (“[The] policy of this chapter is to
give maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract.”).
177. Id. § 18-301(d) (describing the requirements for admission of members in
a Delaware LLC).
178. Id. § 18-302(a) (describing classes and voting rights in a Delaware LLC).
179. In 2007, The Blackstone Group, L.P. went public as a Delaware limited
partnership. In a statement equally applicable to public LLCs, The Blackstone
Group, L.P. noted:
We are a limited partnership and will qualify for exceptions from certain
corporate governance and other requirements of the rules of the New
York Stock Exchange. Pursuant to these exceptions, limited partnerships
may elect not to comply with certain corporate governance requirements
of the New York Stock Exchange, including the requirements (1) that a
majority of the board of directors of our general partner consist of
independent directors, [and] (2) that we have a nominating/corporate
governance committee that is composed entirely of independent
directors . . . . In addition, we will not be required to hold annual
meetings of our common unitholders. Following this offering, we intend
to avail ourselves of these exceptions. Accordingly, you will not have the
same protections afforded to equityholders of entities that are subject to
all of the corporate governance requirements of the New York Stock
Exchange.
THE BLACKSTONE GROUP, L.P, PROSPECTUS (FORM 424(B)(4)) 55 (2007).
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Court of Chancery and Delaware Supreme Court now have more
combined case law experience in matters of LLC contract
180
interpretation than any other jurisdiction.
2.

Forming and Tailoring the Business

In order to form a Delaware LLC, one or more authorized
181
The certificate
persons must execute a certificate of formation.
of formation must be filed with the Secretary of State and must
contain the name of the limited liability company, including the
designation LLC or L.L.C., the address of the registered office, and
the name and address of the registered agent for service of
182
The certificate of formation may also contain any other
process.
183
The actual formation of a
information the parties desire.
Delaware LLC is somewhat confusing. Section 18-201(b) provides:
A limited liability company is formed at the time of the
filing of the initial certificate of formation in the office of
the Secretary of State or at any later date or time specified
in the certificate of formation if, in either case, there has
been substantial compliance with the requirements of this
section. A limited liability company formed under this
chapter shall be a separate legal entity, the existence of
which as a separate legal entity shall continue until
cancellation of the limited liability company’s certificate
184
of formation.
However, Delaware requires the existence of an LLC operating
185
Pursuant to section 18agreement to form a Delaware LLC.
201(d), an LLC agreement “shall be entered into or otherwise
existing either before, after or at the time of the filing of a
186
The LLC agreement may be oral,
certificate of formation.”
187
188
implied, or written, but is not subject to the statute of frauds.
180. See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (permitting the
elimination of fiduciary duties in LLCs); Delaware LLC Operating Agreement,
MYLLCAGREEMENT.COM, http://www.myllcagreement.com/state-llc-agreement
/delaware-llc-operating-agreement.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2011) (stating that
one of the many reasons Delaware is often the choice state to form an LLC is
Delaware has a considerable amount of LLC case law).
181. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-201(a).
182. Id. § 18-201(a)(1)–(2).
183. Id. § 18-201(3).
184. Id. § 18-201(b).
185. Id. § 18-201(d).
186. Id.
187. Id. § 18-101(7) (“‘[L]imited liability company agreement’ means any
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The LLC agreement, whether existing before, at the same time as
or after the time of filing, may be made effective as of the date of
the formation of the LLC or such other time as is specified in the
189
It is imperative, therefore, that practitioners
LLC agreement.
beware of the Delaware statute and make sure that both a
certificate of formation and an LLC agreement exist before
allowing clients to transact business in the LLC name.
In addition to the standard LLC, Delaware offers a “series”
190
limited liability company. To create a Delaware “series” LLC, the
certificate of formation must contain a notice of the limitation of
191
liability of the series. A “series” is, in essence, an allocation by the
LLC operating agreement of the company’s property, assets or
obligations, and the profits or losses attendant to the property,
192
Members, managers, or LLC
assets, or obligations so allocated.
193
Separate records must
interests may be designated to the series.
be maintained for each series so that assets may be identified to a
194
single series as well as losses or profits generated by that series. If
the certificate of formation sets forth the mandated notice of series
and its limitations of liabilities and separate books and accounts are
maintained for each series, then the debts, obligations, and profits
of each series remain solely with that series and cannot cross into
195
Each series may have a different
the assets of another series.
196
A properly formed
“business purpose or investment objective.”
series may “carry on any lawful business, purpose or activity,
197
whether or not for profit.” In addition, each series may sue or be
sued in its own name, and has the power and capacity to contract,
hold title to property (real, personal, or intangible), and grant liens
agreement (whether referred to as a limited liability company agreement,
operating agreement or otherwise), written, oral or implied, of the member or
members as to the affairs of a limited liability company and the conduct of its
business.”).
188. Id. (“A limited liability company agreement is not subject to any statute of
frauds (including § 2714 of this title).”).
189. Id. § 18-201(d).
190. Id. § 18-215(a) (“A limited liability company agreement may establish or
provide for the establishment of [one] or more designated series of members,
managers, limited liability company interests or assets.”).
191. Id. § 18-215(b).
192. Id. § 18-215(a).
193. Id.
194. Id. § 18-215(b).
195. Id.
196. Id. § 18-215(a).
197. Id. § 18-215(c).
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198

Management of the Delaware LLC

A Delaware limited liability company does not need to
199
designate whether it is member-managed or manager-managed.
Under Delaware law, both members and managers retain agency
authority to bind the LLC whether or not the company is member200
The operating agreement of the parties
or manager-managed.
dictates their rights, including, but not limited to, voting rights,
profit interests, loss sharing, notices and consents for meeting
purposes, access to information and confidentiality provisions, and
201
exit rights on dissociation, dissolution, termination, or expulsion.
In other words, the parties to the company agreement are free to
contract for whatever provisions each desires. There is no
requirement that the parties bargain for “fair” or “equal” terms
since business issues might dictate that one investor may wish solely
to “do good” whereas another may wish to generate an internal rate
of return on her investment. Each party bargains for its own
interests. The Delaware LLC imposes no statutory or judicial
burden of equality of investment or motive by the contracting
202
The policy of “freedom of contract” clearly upholds this
parties.
203
interpretation by the Delaware courts.
Further, Delaware courts apply a “plain meaning”
204
interpretation to partnership and LLC operating agreements.
198. Id.
199. Id. § 18-402.
200. Id.
201. See Peter J. Walsh, Jr. & Dominick T. Gattuso, Delaware LLCs: The Wave of
the Future and Advising Your Clients About What to Expect, 19 BUS. L. TODAY 11, 11
(2009) (“As business law practitioners know, limited liability companies are
creatures of contract. Delaware’s statutory scheme affords members virtually
unlimited discretion to define the terms of their relationship in the operating
agreement.”).
202. See Mohsen Manesh, Delaware and the Market For LLC Law: A Theory of
Contractability and Legal Indeterminancy, 52 B.C. L. REV. 189, 193 (2011) (noting the
perception that “heightened contractibility and reduced indeterminacy” makes
Delaware appear more attractive to incorporating business but also noting that
these features may actually harm Delaware).
203. See Ann E. Conaway, The Multi-Facets of Good Faith in Delaware: A Mistake in
the Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; A Different Partnership Duty of Care; Agency
Good Faith and Damages; Good Faith and Trust Law, 10 DEL. L. REV. 89, 102–04
(2008).
204. QVT Fund LP v. Eurohypo Capital Funding LLC, C.A. No. 5881-VCP,
2011 WL 2672092, at *10 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2011).
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Under a plain meaning approach, the Delaware judiciary will not
admit extrinsic evidence into an unambiguous contract for the
205
The plain meaning
purpose of rendering it ambiguous.
interpretative guide provides sponsors and investors with the
needed certainty that negotiated agreements will be upheld despite
206
Other jurisdictions, applying a
changing market conditions.
“realism” test, permit parol evidence in order to discern intent with
the result that “realism” courts render the parties’ hard-won
207
In many cases, these courts, espousing
contractual terms moot.
“realism,” in fact utilize vague tort-based fiduciary duties to fill gaps
that the parties intended to be left blank or filled by commercially
208
reasonable standards. Thus, courts that “reform” contracts in the
name of fiduciary duties are bullwhipping investors with their own
contract. Delaware courts, on the other hand, are loath to bind
parties to terms to which neither party agreed—true freedom from
209
contract.
4. The Delaware LLC—The Ultimate in Entity Efficiency and
Investor Flexibility
Because of its statutory policy of freedom of contract and other
unique features, the Delaware LLC is unlike almost all United
210
The ability to craft a hybrid
States limited liability companies.
205. Athenian Venture Partners I, L.P. v. GMG Capital Invs., LLC, C.A. No.
08C-04-084 DCS, 2011 WL 883013, at *6 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 10, 2011).
206. See Related Westpac LLC v. JER Snowmass LLC, C.A. No. 5001-VCS, 2010
WL 2929708, at *1 (Del. Ch. July 23, 2010).
207. See Stephenson v. Oneok Res. Co., 99 P.3d 717, 722–23 (Okla. Civ. App.
2004) (noting that when an ambiguity is present in a joint operating agreement,
the jury is entitled to consider extrinsic evidence to resolve the ambiguity); Smith
v. Osguthorpe, 58 P.3d 854, 863 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) (holding that the trial court
was required to consider parol evidence in determining whether a partnership
dissolution agreement was fully integrated or not).
208. See, e.g., Bishop of Victoria Corp. Sole v. Corp. Bus. Park, 158 P.3d 1183,
1190 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).
209. See, e.g., QVT Fund LP, 2011 WL 2672092, at *10; Related Westpac LLC, 2010
WL 2929708, at *1; Athenian Venture Partners, 2011 WL 883013, at *6.
210. See generally, Ann E. Conaway, Why No Respect? The Contractual Duties of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing in Delaware, SOC. SCI. RES. NETWORK (June 17, 2007),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=994624## (explaining the
statutory policy of “freedom of contract” in Delaware unincorporated entity law
and the confusion of some courts in applying these contractarian principles of
traditional fiduciary duties). Georgia, Kansas, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Utah, and
Virginia also have “freedom to contract” provisions. See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-111107(b), 14-2-920 (2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-76,134(b) (2010); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, § 2058(D) (2010); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8916(b), 8520(d) (2010);
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business with a blend of investors with differing financial objectives
is precisely what is necessary for socially-driven, economically
responsible organizations. The Delaware LLC does not require a
special statute or amendment to an existing statute to accomplish a
socially beneficial goal. Also, unlike the B Corporation, the
Delaware LLC has no mandate that the certificate of formation
publicly announce its purpose or objectives since neither members
nor managers have personal liability for the debts or obligations of
211
the LLC.
The Delaware LLC has the further advantage of its “series”
212
If, for example, a renewable energy technology
provisions.
business wished to explore solar as well as onshore and offshore
wind possibilities, each different technology and asset base could
be allocated to a separate series in order to insulate similar sectors
or technologies of the business, whether or not they outperform
another in any given year. Likewise, if one technology suffered a
loss due to design failures, the other branches of the business
would be sheltered from loss by the internal liability shield of the
series if notice and separate records were properly maintained.
As noted in the section on the L3C, the standard LLC can
accomplish everything that the L3C can but without the limitations
and contradictory applications of fiduciary duties to financially
213
Delaware has solved the duties issue by
adverse investors.
granting a full complement of investor authority to eliminate or
limit the application of duties or liability for breach of duties,
especially where those duties are raised in a nontraditional,
214
In essence, Delaware LLC law permits the
“stakeholder” setting.
sponsors/founders themselves to determine how best to regulate
compliance with the “purpose” and “objective” of the social or
environmental goal of the company as weighted against the
interests of certain capital investors who seek a simple return on
their investment. The LLC operating agreement may set forth:
standards of compliance; priorities of distributions; asset
management for third-party beneficiaries; remedies for unhappy
UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1901 (2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1282(B) (West 2010);
Conaway, supra at 3.
211. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(d) (2010); Conaway, supra note 210,
at 7.
212. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-215.
213. See supra Part III.D.1, 3.
214. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(6)–(7); Conaway, supra note 210, at 3
n.4.
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parties, including third-party beneficiaries; exit rights for
disgruntled capital investors; capital call rights; weighted voting
among classes of stakeholders; or the need, or lack thereof, for a
“compliance officer” to draft a status report to be circulated to
215
stakeholders annually.
VI. CONCLUSION
Social entrepreneurship is an increasing beacon in today’s
marketplace. New and existing businesses are seeking to “do
good,” “give back,” prioritize the human capital of their ventures,
and generate wealth for investors all at the same time. Seeking this
“triple bottom line” is not only good marketing but also good
business and social stewardship. What is confusing this sector of
the U.S. economy is the growth of “niche” entities—the B
Corporation and the L3C—that serve no economic or financial
purpose but instead confuse an otherwise overburdened entityladen choice of entity feast.
For example, the B Corporation requires yet another statute to
overlay “stakeholder” interests onto over one hundred years of the
fiduciary-driven corporate paradigm.
Yet, “stakeholder
constituency” statutes already exist for other purposes in many
jurisdictions. The B Corporation does not create clarity in the
arena of social enterprises—just the opposite. The B Corporation
sets up the ultimate dichotomy of traditional fiduciary duties owed
to stockholders under the common law of corporate entities versus
a new law that inserts “stakeholders” and third-party beneficiaries
into the corporate common law paradigm. This confusion is the
proverbial tip of the iceberg. Any court interpreting a dispute
arising from a B Corporation must consider the appropriate
application of the business judgment rule, equity, and entire
fairness. The B Corporation essentially sells investors a lawsuit.
Likewise, the L3C is confusing and unnecessary. The L3C
requires amendments to LLC legislation and accomplishes nothing
that a standard limited liability company could not achieve. The
L3C indeed does greater harm by adding language that seemingly
tracks federal tax definitions of PRIs, yet the state and federal
215. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-101(7) (2010). For general information
regarding operating agreements, see 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limited Liability Companies § 4
(2011); LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES § 4:16 (2011). For an example of an operating
agreement form, see 12 AM. JUR. 2D Legal Forms § 167A:8 (2011).
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definitions are not in sync. Also, compliance with the state
definition does not guarantee a foundation that its investment will
receive favorable tax treatment since the PRI must also satisfy the
foundation’s own internal purposes and objectives. To the unwary
and uninitiated, the L3C is misleading and thus harmful to the
market.
In the United Kingdom, the limited company may be
organized for a social and profitable purpose so long as this is
reflected in the articles of association under the Companies Act
2006. The current disadvantage of the limited company is that it
must adhere to “transparency” requirements, including: public
filing of internal articles of association, mandatory auditor
procedures and filings, compliance of insolvency and
disqualification of directors’ provisions, and other market-related
provisions. In addition, the limited company cannot eliminate
liability for a breach of fiduciary duty or the duty itself. The only
“limitation” on a director’s duty is in the nature of the purpose and
objective of the business. Thus, if the corporate enterprise is
defined as being primarily for benefit and secondarily for profit,
directors are tasked with sorting their duties accordingly. In many
cases, these duties will be owed to investors with opposite financial
interests in the venture.
Also in the United Kingdom is the limited liability
partnership—a body corporate. The disadvantages to the LLP are
that it requires at least two persons for formation and it retains the
corporate mandates for transparency and thus public filings for its
internal operating documents. Also, the LLP is subject to virtually
all the filing provisions that apply to a limited company under the
Companies Act 1985. In terms of fiduciary duties, like the limited
company, the LLP cannot eliminate fiduciary duties or liability for
breaches of fiduciary duties. However, the articles of association
for the LLP may “limit” the members’ duties by limiting the
purpose of the LLP primarily to a beneficial cause with profit
generation being only a secondary motive. The members’ duties
then mirror the purpose/objective of the corporate body.
However, like the limited company, members are put to the task of
satisfying investors with diverse financial expectations.
Clearly, the most investor and market friendly of all entities
available today for social stewardship and profit return is the
Delaware limited liability company. The Delaware LLC comes
packaged with a state policy of “freedom of contract” that
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encourages investors, foundations, and sponsors to craft their own
deal—whatever that deal may be. The Delaware Limited Liability
Company Act does not impose any statutory fiduciary duties on
members or managers, but the parties are free to include any
duties should they desire. If the parties do not wish to insert
fiduciary duties, they are free to craft any internal structure they
wish—whether it is for benefit, for profit, or both. The LLC may be
formed as a “series” LLC and the operating agreement may allocate
property or assets among series and designate members or
managers to each series as well as profits and losses to those series.
Each series may have a different business purpose or objective and
may contract, hold title, and sue or be sued in the series’ name.
The series may be formed with a single member and may “elect” its
tax status under the “check-the-box” tax regulations. Finally, the
Delaware Supreme Court and the Delaware Court of Chancery
together have interpreted more LLC agreements than any other
jurisdiction. This judicial predictability in Delaware lowers agency
costs significantly for a Delaware LLC—more than the formation of
an LLC in any other U.S. jurisdiction.
Social entrepreneurship is the trend of the future. New
“boutique” legislation is unpredictable and unreliable. For serious
social stewards, the global entity of choice is the Delaware LLC.
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